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Abstract—To address the issue that Lagrangian dual function
based algorithms cannot guarantee convergence and global op-
timality for decentralized multi-area security constrained unit
commitment (M-SCUC) problems, a novel decomposition and
coordination method using MILP (mixed integer linear pro-
gramming) value functions is proposed in this paper. Each
regional system operator sets the tie-line power injections as
variational parameters in its regional SCUC model, and utilizes
a finite algorithm to generate a MILP value function, which
returns the optimal generation cost for any given interchange
scheduling. With the value functions available from all system
operators, theoretically, a coordinator is able to derive a globally
optimal interchange scheduling. Since power exchanges may alter
the financial position of each area considerably from what it
would have been via scheduling independently, we then propose
a fair savings allocation method using the values functions
derived above and the Shapley value in cooperative game theory.
Numerical experiments on a two-area 12-bus system and a three-
area 457-bus system are carried out. The validness of the value
functions based method is verified for the decentralized M-SCUC
problems. The outcome of savings allocation is compared with
that of the locational marginal cost based method.
Index Terms—Decentralized algorithm, MILP value function,
multi-area power systems, parametric programming, security
constrained unit commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE real-world power systems are usually composedof several regional sub-systems interconnected by tie-
lines. Such bulk power systems are referred to as multi-area
power systems. In the context of short-term operation, multi-
area security constrained unit commitment (M-SCUC) models
have been widely applied in the market clearing or genera-
tion/interchange scheduling of multi-area power systems [1]–
[3]. One of the crucial issues of M-SCUC is the interchange
scheduling, which can save considerable operating costs if
optimally performed.
The essential difference between M-SCUC and single-area
SCUC problems is that under most circumstances, M-SCUC
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should be performed in a decentralized manner. This is due
to the way how regional system operators and the higher-
level system operator (or the coordinator) are organized, e.g.,
the hierarchical control architecture in China [4], [5], and
the proxy bus systems in the US [6], [7]. Though easy
for implementation, current methods may suffer from sub-
optimality or market inefficiency [5], [7].
The challenge of solving M-SCUC is to achieve joint
optimality of this complex problem and meanwhile preserve
the decentralized decision-making procedure among regional
operators. Theoretically, this can be tackled by solving a
decentralized mathematical programming problem. For convex
power system optimal dispatch problems, efficient decentral-
ized solution methods can be easily found [8]. Among these
methods, augmented Lagrangian function based methods, e.g.,
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), auxiliary
problem principle (APP) are most popular [9], [10]. Besides,
other methods like modified generalized benders decomposi-
tion method [4], cutting plane consensus method [11], etc. are
applicable as well.
However, the above methods are developed based on the
convexity condition of the optimization problem. For M-
SCUC, due to the non-convexity caused by integer variables,
strong duality doesn’t hold, and hence these methods cannot
guarantee convergence and global optimality. Heuristics or pa-
rameters tunings are needed to ensure the algorithms converge
to a local optimum [3], [12], [13].
In the community of operations research, some contributions
have been made recently on the topic of solving decentralized
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problems. For ex-
ample, the authors in [14] verify that the coupling constraints
of the primal MILPs can be modified to guarantee that the
solutions recovered from the dual are feasible, and the quality
of solutions also improves as the size of coupling constraints
increases. However, the coupling constraints in M-SCUC (i.e.,
consensus conditions of tie-line power or boundary phase
angle) are “hard” conditions, which cannot be relaxed. In [15],
it is shown that the duality gap of some types of augmented
Lagrangian dual can be closed, but the resulting sub-problems
are always inseparable. In [16], the authors propose a fully
distributed algorithm for MILP. In the proposed scheme, each
agent solves a linear programming (LP) and exchanges active
constraints to update the LP model, and the algorithm will con-
verge a suboptimal solution up to any given tolerance. More
recently, reference [17] proposes a parallelizable augmented
Lagrangian method, which is proved to converge to the optimal
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2solution under mild conditions. But the method relies on a
subroutine of refining the convex hulls of the feasible regions
of each sub-problems, which may be intractable for large-scale
problems.
On the other hand, after the power interchange is scheduled,
conventionally the locational marginal prices (LMPs) derived
from the the Lagrangian multipliers of the SCUC problem
are adopted for market clearing or cost allocation. However,
it is well-known that the Lagrangian multiplier of a MILP
cannot depict the real change in optimal cost as the right-
hand side is perturbed, due to its non-convexity. Thus the price
signal is unnecessary true. Actually, it is vital to fairly allocate
the resulting economic benefits of coordinately interchange
scheduling [18]. For a non-convex market, we can turn to the
cooperative game theory (e.g., the Shapley value [19]) for a
promising method of cost or profit allocation [20], [21].
We find that another type of dual function, i.e., the value
function [22], naturally provides a zero-gap with respect to
the primal problem, and therefore can be used to solve the
decentralized M-SCUC problem. Moreover, it is applicable
for savings allocation when we use the Shapley value. In
mathematical programming, the value function is a real-valued
function that takes a right-hand side vector as input, and re-
turns the optimal objective value of the programming instance,
which is parameterized on that right-hand side vector [22]. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
1) We study the MILP value function of the SCUC problem,
and develop a finite algorithm for its construction.
2) Based on the SCUC value functions, we then propose
a new global solution method for the decentralized M-
SCUC problem, which needs limited information sharing
and no iterations between system operators.
3) Using the SCUC value functions, we derive a fair and
stable savings allocation scheme based on the Shapley
value, and compare it with the LMPs based method.
4) The effectiveness of our method is demonstrated on a
two-area 12-bus system and a three-area 457-bus system.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The framework of the proposed method is given in Fig. 1.
In order to solve the M-SCUC problem in a decentralized
manner, the solution procedure is divided into two steps. First,
each regional system generates its value function described
by a set of UC solutions; then, the coordinator collects the
value functions to determine the interchange scheduling, and
meanwhile decide the systems’ payoffs. In this section, we
present the M-SCUC model, and introduce the concepts of
MILP value function and Shapley value first.
A. Multi-area Power Systems SCUC Problem
Conventionally, the SCUC problem is modeled as a
MILP [23]. For the M-SCUC model, we choose tie-line
injections as the coupling variables between areas. The full
Area 1 
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1 described by a set of 
UC solutions
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Generate value function 
2 described by a set of 
UC solutions
tie-line
1-2
Decide payoff 1
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function 2
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2-N
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Fig. 1. Framework of the decentralized solution procedure.
formulation is removed temporarily due to space limitations.
Hereafter, we focus on its compact matrix formulation,
min
xa,ya,za
∑
a∈A
c>Iaxa + c
>
Caya (1a)
s. t. Gaxa ≤ ga ∀a ∈ A (1b)
Haya ≤ ha ∀a ∈ A (1c)
Aaxa +Daya ≤ 0 ∀a ∈ A (1d)
Baya + za = da ∀a ∈ A (1e)
zmina ≤ za ≤ zmaxa ∀a ∈ A (1f)∑
a∈A
Caza = 0, (1g)
where A is the set of area, xa indicates the 0-1 binary unit
commitment variables of area a, ya the continuous dispatch
variables of area a, za the tie-line injection variables of area a,
and cIa, cCa are the cost coefficients associated with xa and
ya respectively. Constraint (1b) includes the state transition
equations of units and minimum on/off time limits of units;
constraint (1c) includes ramping limits of units, power flow
limits on internal transmission lines; constraint (1d) is the
coupling constraint of xa and ya (i.e., the generation capacity
limit); constraint (1e) represents the power balance condition
(e.g., the DC power flow equation); constraint (1f) represents
the power flow limits of tie-lines; and constraint (1g) is the
consensus condition between areas, indicating that the nodal
injections of two ends of a tie-line should be identical. The
right-hand side vector ga is composed of the minimum on/off
time of units, ha the ramping capacities of units, transmission
line ratings, reserve requirements, etc., and da the nodal
injections (load demands).
Problem (1) can be written as a two-stage optimization
problem, i.e.,
min
za
∑
a∈A
Va(za) (2a)
s. t. (1f), (1g) (2b)
Va(za) = min
xa,ya
c>Iaxa + c
>
Caya (2c)
s. t. (1b), (1c), (1d), (1e). (2d)
Herein, Va(za) is a function parameterized on the tie-line
injection vector za, and it stands for the SCUC problem of area
a. By eliminating free variables ya and inequality constraints
(1b)-(1d) with nonnegative slack variables, the a-th SCUC
3problem can be reduced to a standard MILP as below [24],
Va(za) = min
(xa,ya)∈Sa(za)
c>Iaxa + c
>
Caya, (3)
where Sa(za) is the feasible region, i.e.,
Sa(za) =
{
(x,y) ∈ Bma × Rna+ : AIaxa +ACaya = z˜a
}
,
(4)
and B denotes {0, 1}, R+ denotes [0,+∞). In the standard
MILP (3), decision variables xa and ya are augmented with
slack variables, parameter matrix AIa and ACa are composed
of the data associated with the binary variables and continuous
variables in problem (1) respectively, and the right-hand side
vector z˜a is the combination of za, ga, ha and da, etc.
B. Value Function of SCUC
In engineering practice, it is helpful to realize how the
optimal solution or the optimal objective value would change,
when the parameter of an optimization problem is slightly per-
turbed. This is known as the sensitivity analysis. Accordingly,
determining how the optimal objective value varies with the
parameters in a full range falls into the scope of parametric
programming [7], [25], or the study of value function [22].
In this subsection, we take the SCUC problem (3) for
example to illustrate the concept of MILP value function.
For brevity, herein the subscript a is omitted and z˜ is simply
denoted as z. Thus, set (4) can be rewritten as,
S(z) =
{
(x,y) ∈ Bm × Rn+ : AIx+ACy = z
}
. (5)
Definition 1. The value function of MILP is a real-valued
function V : Rr → R parameterized on z, i.e.,
V (z) = min
(x,y)∈S(z)
c>I x+ c
>
Cy ∀z ∈ Z. (6)
where Z = {z ∈ Rr : S (z) 6= ∅} is the domain of z within
which the minimum of (6) is attainable.
Besides, we let
SC(x, z) =
{
y ∈ Rn+ : AIx+ACy = z
}
,
SI(z) = {x ∈ Bm : SC (x, z) 6= ∅} ,
and SI = ∪z∈ZSI (z) .
By construction, SI is the set of all binary solutions that
making set SC(x, z) unempty. Then, for all z ∈ Z we have
V (z) = min
(x,y)∈S(z)
c>I x+ c
>
Cy (7a)
= min
x∈SI(z)
min
y∈SC(x,z)
c>I x+ c
>
Cy (7b)
= min
x∈SI
max
ν∈SD
(z −AIx)>ν + c>I x, (7c)
where SD =
{
ν ∈ Rr : A>Cν ≤ cC
}
is the dual feasible
region.
Equation (7c) shows that given any integer solution x ∈ SI ,
V (z) is the maximum of many affine functions in z (thus
is a convex polyhedral function); and the full description of
V (z) can be obtained by taking the minimum of |SI | convex
polyhedral functions. In fact, a subset of SI can be sufficient
to characterize V (z) [22], because for some integer solutions
xˆ, profile (z,maxν∈SD (z −AI xˆ)>ν + c>I xˆ) lies on the
interior of the epigraph1 of V (z), so these integer solutions
are unessential to describe it. We denote by SminI the minimal
subset of SI required to describe V (z).
Reference [26] provides a formal description of this func-
tion: the MILP value function is lower semi-continuous,
subadditive, and piecewise polyhedral over Z. An example to
show such properties will be given by Fig. 3 in Section V-A.
C. Shapley Value of Cooperative Games
Cooperative games deal with the problem of determining
a fair and stable division of surplus earned by the coalition,
which is formed by rational players. We regard the M-SCUC
problem as a transferable utility (TU) game, which means that
payments are allowed between players [19], [21], [27].
Definition 2. A TU game is given by Γ = 〈A, v〉 where:
• A is the set of n (n = |A|) rational players;
• v(C) is a characteristic function, v : 2n → R+ with
v(∅) = 0, that maps from each possible coalition C ⊆ A
to the worth of C.
In the game of M-SCUC, each area incurs some cost in
producing power, and the areas (players) agree to form a
grand coalition and work together by coordinately interchange
scheduling. Through exchanging power in an efficient way, the
total cost should be less than that is achieved by dispatching
alone or forming some smaller coalitions. In order for the
equality and stability of the grand coalition, the Shapley value
is introduced to divide the surplus. The Shapley value is a
function that assigns to the characteristic function a n-tuple
of real numbers, i.e., φ(v) = (φ1(v), φ2(v), . . . , φn(v)). It
can be calculated with the belowing formula,
φa(v) =
∑
C⊆A\{a}
|C|!(|A| − |C| − 1)!
|A|! (v(C ∪ {a})− v(C)).
(8)
In (8), the second part v(C ∪ {a}) − v(C) is the marginal
contribution when player a enters coalition C, and the fraction
on the left side is a coefficient indicating the probability that
player a enters a coalition of this size.
Shapley value is the unique solution that satisfies the
Shapley axioms [28], i.e., efficiency, symmetry, dummy axiom
and additivity. Moreover, it can be proved that the game of
M-SCUC is superadditive and convex [29], and hence the
Shapley value is individually rational and stable, i.e., no small
coalitions (including individuals) could obtain more by acting
alone than they can receive from φ.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SCUC VALUE FUNCTION
In this section, an algorithm for constructing the set SminI is
presented. We’re aware that the authors in [22] have proposed a
cutting plane algorithm, which starts at a singleton in SI and
then dynamically generates the set SminI . Yet, the algorithm
assumes there exists xˆ ∈ SI so that AI xˆ = z 6= 0, and
this is not practical in the SCUC case, e.g., it requires that
1The epigraph is epi(V ) = {(z, v) : z ∈ Z, v ∈ R, v ≥ V (z)} ⊆ Rr+1.
40 = da−za 6= 0 for constraint (1e). In this paper, we propose
a more sophisticated algorithm for the construction of SminI ,
which is detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Construction of the MILP Value Function
Initialize: Choose an initial right-hand side vector z0 ∈ Z, derive
an initial integer solution x0 = arg minx∈SI (z0),yc
>
I x+c
>
Cy, let
iteration counter k = 0, set Sk = {x0}, deviation ∆k = +∞ and
maximum size of set be K.
while ∆k > 0 and k < K do
• Solve (9) to obtain a new integer solution xk+1
∆k = max
z∈Z
V (z)− V (z) (9)
where
V (z) = min
i=0,...,k
c>I x
i + c>Cy
i +M · 1>
(
si+ + s
i
−
)
s. t. AIx
i +ACy
i +Esi+ −Esi− = z
xi ∈ Sk, si+ and si−nonnegtive
E an identity matrix, M a penalty factor.
• Set Sk+1 ← Sk ∪ {xk+1}, k ← k + 1.
end while
return Sk
The main idea of problem (9) is to find a z value under
which the current approximation is mostly distinct from the
true value function, and generate a relevant xk+1 ∈ SminI \Sk.
Problem (9) can be recast as a mixed integer nonlinear
programming (MINLP) below,
∆k = max
z∈Z
θ − (c>I x+ c>Cy)
s. t. νi ∈ SD ∩ [−M,M ]r i = 0, ..., k, (x,y) ∈ S(z)
θ ≤ (z −AIxi)>νi + c>I xi i = 0, ..., k. (10)
Problem (10) can be solved by solvers like BARON and
COUENNE, but it is more efficient to reformulate it as a MILP
problem. In this paper, by employing a MILP reformulation
technique, namely piecewise McCormick relaxation to the
bilinear term z>νi, we then approximately solve (10) as a
MILP problem denoted as ∆k. The reformulation procedure
can be found in [25], which deals with the multi-parametric
MILP problems. The optimal value ∆k yielded from the
the MILP reformulation is an approximation to that of (10),
however, the sub-optimality will not affect the process of
finding new integer solution once ∆k is positive (a new xk+1
can be generated). Ideally, Algorithm 1 will return Sk = SminI .
In our practice of computation, we set K as a proper number
to have Algorithm 1 terminate within an acceptable period
of time and return a subset of SminI . In engineering practice,
typical historical unit commitment solutions can be added into
Sk to accelerate the convergence.
IV. DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION METHOD OF M-SCUC
AND SAVINGS ALLOCATION
A. Solving Decentralized M-SCUC with Value Functions
As the set SminI is obtained, the characterization of the
change of optimal generation cost in a full range of inter-
change level could be identified. With such characterization
information of every area (SminIa ), intuitively, the coordinator
is able to work out an interchange scheduling that globally
minimizes the joint cost of the interconnected power system.
Recall that in (2a) the M-SCUC problem has been written
as minza
∑
a∈A Va(za), and now we have,
Va(za)
(7c)
= min
xa∈SIa
max
νa∈SDa
(z˜a −AIaxa)>νa + c>Iaxa
= max
νia,θa
θa (11a)
s. t. i = 0, ..., ka
θa ≤ (z˜a −AIaxia)
>
νia + c
>
Iax
i
a (11b)
A>Caν
i
a ≤ cCa, (11c)
where ka = |SminIa |. Equation (11) shows that with SminIa
in hand, the value of Va(za) can be achieved simply by
solving a LP problem, i.e., maxνia,θa θa. By substituting the LP
expression of Va(za) into minza
∑
a∈A Va(za), and retaining
the constraints on za, we obtain a min-max problem,
min
za
max
νia,θa
∑
a∈A
θa
s. t. (1f), (1g)
(11b) ∀a ∈ A : χia
(11c) ∀a ∈ A : γia. (12)
It can be proved that (12) is equivalent with the MILP below,
min
za,χia,γ
i
a
∑
a∈A
ka∑
i=1
χiac
>
Iax
i
a + c
>
Caγa
s. t. (1f), (1g)
ka∑
i
χia(z¯a −AIaxia) + za −ACaγa = 0 ∀a ∈ A
ka∑
i
χia = 1 χ
i
a ∈ B ∀a ∈ A (13)
where z¯a is a vector obtained by substituting entries of za
in z˜a with zeros. Problem (13) has the following intuitive
interpretation: binary variable χia picks up a unit commitment
solution from set Smina for each area, za decides the tie-line
injection, while γa determines the optimal dispatch of area
a. Although (13) looks like the primal M-SCUC problem (1),
solving problem (13) is quite different and it enjoys some
attractive properties:
• Decentralization. In the proposed scheme, each area sets
tie-line injections za as variational parameters, and com-
putes a set of unit commitment solutions SminIa required
to describe its SCUC value function; then the coordinator
employs SminIa to solve (13) and determines the inter-
change scheduling. The scheme is suitable for multi-area
power systems with a hierarchical control architecture.
• Privacy. When passing data to the coordinator, area a can
send c>Iax
i
a as a scalar α
i
a, and (z¯a−AIaxia) as a vector
βia. Hence, some identifiable structures and data of the
regional SCUC problem are removed. However, pricing
information cCa and network topology information im-
5plied in ACa should be exposed. If this is not preferred,
we can be avoid it by using the direct description of
the SCUC value function2, instead of the integer solution
set description. Since SminIa is available now, to obtain
the direct description, we only have to solve |ka| multi-
parametric LPs.
• Computational efficiency. The number of binary vari-
ables, given by
∑
a∈A |ka|, is usually smaller than that
in M-SCUC (1). Solving problem (13) is always less
time-consuming in large-scale problems. This will be
demonstrated latter in Section V-B.
• Reliability. Problem (13) is one-shot. Compared with
iterative algorithms, solving problem (13) has no con-
vergence problems and durative communication demand.
Finally, we have the following Proposition for problem (13):
Proposition 1. If the UC solution set from every regional
system is complete, i.e., ka = |Ska | = |SminIa | ∀a ∈ A, then the
interchange scheduling yielded from (13) globally optimizes
the M-SCUC problem; if ka < |SminIa | for some a ∈ A, then
the interchange scheduling is sub-optimal.
B. Allocating Savings Using the Shapley Value and SCUC
Value Functions
Traditionally, market clearing methods based on LMPs are
adopted to determine the payment of energy trading between
areas, e.g., payment=energy×LMP , where LMP is the opti-
mal Lagrangian multiplier associated with the row containing
a nodal injection parameter. From another point of view, as
clarified in Section II-C, coordinated interchange scheduling
is a cooperative game that leads to surplus, and hence the
payments between regional systems can be derived from the
Shapley value.
The characteristic function v(C) is essential to calculate
the Shapley value. Basically, we have worth=revenue−cost .
Without loss of generality, we assume the revenue of each area
to be constant so that it can be neglected. Thus, v(C) can be
obtained simply from the generation cost, i.e.,
v(C) = −min
za
∑
a∈C
Va(za)
s. t. (1f), (1g)
za = 0 ∀a ∈ A\C. (14)
The last constraint in problem (14) implies that power can be
exchanged within a coalition only. Problem (14) can also be
reformulated as a MILP problem similar with (13).
Finally, as the payoff vector φ(v) is yielded, the payment
between areas can be computed according to
φa(v) = −Va(z∗a)− ψa, (15)
where z∗a is the optimal solution of problem (13), Va(z
∗
a)
represents the real generation cost of area a acting in the
grand coalition, and ψa is the payment of area a (the utility
2Direct description means describing the optimal objective value by a set of
affine functions purely of za, that contain no information of the original MILP
problem. Direct description is the purpose of multi-parametric MILP [25]. We
will give a demonstration of this with Fig. 3 latter in Section V-A.
TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE TEST SYSTEMS.
System Composition Buses Units Tie-lines
two-area IEEE 6-, 6-bus 12 8 1
three-area IEEE 39-, 118-, 300-bus 457 133 4
G1 G2
G3 G4
B3B1 B2
B4
B5 B6
G5 G6
G7 G8
B9B7 B8
Tie-line
B10
B11 B12
Area 1 Area 2
(a)
B39
39-bus 118-bus
300-bus
Area 1
Area 2
Area 3
B31
B35
B104
B76
B273B160
B128
(b)
Fig. 2. Diagrams of the test systems. (a) two-area sytem. (b) three-area sytem.
area a should transfer to the others). The interpretation of
formula (15) is: under the interchange scheduling z∗a, area
a has profit −Va(z∗a), excluding the worth of meeting load
demand or the revenue of selling electricity to local consumers;
in order to make the payoff fair, area a pays ψa (can be
negative) to other areas; ultimately, the net payoff of area a
should be equal to the Shapley value φa(v).
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, numerical experiments3 are conducted on
two multi-area systems4 to verify the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the proposed method. Main information of the test
systems is summarized in Table I. The diagrams of them are
given in Fig. 2. The two-area system comprises two 6-bus
systems interconnected by a tie-line from bus 3 to bus 7; the
three-area system comprises the 39-bus, 118-bus and 300-bus
systems interconnected by four tie-lines.
A. A One Dimensional Case of the SCUC Value Function
As shown in Definition 1, the SCUC value function is a
real-valued function mapping from Rr to R, where r is the
dimension of nodal injections z. It is hard to depict a high-
dimension function. However, we can allow only one nodal
injection parameter to be variational, so that the SCUC value
function becomes a one dimensional function.
Specifically, we take the area 1 of the two-area system
for example, allow the nodal injection of bus 3 at time 1 to
be variational, and use Algorithm 1 to obtain a set of UC
3MILPs are solved by CPLEX 12.8 on GAMS 26.1; the relative conver-
gence tolerance (optcr) of CPLEX is set as 0. All runs are executed on an
Intel i5 CPU machine running at 1.80 GHz with 8 GB of RAM.
4Available: https://figshare.com/articles/SCUC-VF/7775825/1
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Fig. 3. SCUC value function of the IEEE 6-bus system with respect to the tie-
line injection of bus 3 at one single period, achieved by taking the minimum
of eight convex polyhedral functions (LP value functions).
solutions. As shown in the upper piece of Fig. 3, for a fixed UC
solution, the optimal cost is a piecewise linear function of the
tie-line injection (also known as the LP value function). For
example, given UC solution 2, the cost−tie-line injection
profile has two slopes, namely -18 $/MW and -13 $/MW,
separated by a knee point.
In this case, eight UC solutions are necessary to describe
the SCUC value function. By taking the minimum of these
eight LP value functions, we obtain the SCUC value function
shown by the lower piece of Fig. 3. The value function is
composed of a set of affine functions of z, that designates the
optimal cost directly in some non-overlapping segments of the
tie-line injection. It should be noted that discontinuous points
often arise between two different UC solutions (segments).
Figure 3 can be regarded as a demand/supply curve, and
it shows some facts: i) if the tie-line injection lies within a
segment which has constant slop, the marginal cost is well-
defined and the LMP of SCUC is precise; ii) if the tie-line
injection lies at a knee point or a discontinuous point, the
marginal cost isn’t well-defined.
At the knee points or the discontinuous points, the left- and
right-marginal costs are distinct in general [30]. For example,
at the discontinuous point of the SCUC value function depicted
in the lower piece of Fig. 3, the cost of producing one extra
MW more is 350 $, while that of producing one extra MW
less is -13 $. Due to the ambiguity of marginal cost observed
above, investigating other market clearing methods such as
game theory based methods may be useful.
B. The Results and Efficiencies of Decentralized M-SCUC
In this subsection, we compare the optimality and efficiency
between our method (MILP-VF) and the ADMM-AOP method
proposed in [3]. The latter deploys an alternative optimization
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Fig. 4. The evolutions of relative gaps of MILP-VF method and the
convergence profiles of ADMM-AOP method. (a) two-area sytem. (b) three-
area sytem.
procedure (AOP) to ensure the convergence of the decentral-
ized algorithm. Specifically, ADMM-AOP iteratively fixes the
coupled variables (boundary voltage phase angles) to solve
regional SCUC problems separately, and then fixes the binary
variables (UC solutions) to solve a decentralized multi-area
dispatch problem via ADMM. The centralized optimization
method (Centralized) is set as the benchmark.
As proved in [3], the objective value monotonously de-
creases with the iteration number of ADMM-AOP; as stated
in Section IV-A, MILP-VF is a non-iterative method, and
its optimality only relies on the size of Ska . For both the
two-area system and the three-area system, the convergence
profiles of ADMM-AOP with respect to the iteration number
are plotted in the upper axis (black), whereas the evolutions of
relative gaps of MILP-VF with respect to the size of Ska are
plotted in the lower axis (red), all in Fig. 4. The non-increasing
sequence of relative gaps of MILP-VF indicates that with more
identified UC solutions, the interchange scheduling derived
from problem (13) will be closer to the global optimal solution.
The ADMM-AOP method enjoys good convergence property,
yet the solutions are easily trapped into local optimums within
a few iterations, and hence cannot reach the global optimum.
The gap achieved by MILP-VF in the two-area system
is zero, which demonstrates that the MILP-VF method can
yield a global interchange solution once the value functions
are completely identified. It is also shown in the three-area
system that even with a subset of SminI , MILP-VF can obtain
a solution very close to that of the centralized method. The
relative optimality gaps achieved by ADMM-AOP in two test
systems are 0.24% and 11.80% respectively. The numerical
results are detailed in Table II, in which the costs when no
power is exchanged (Islanded) are also presented.
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COMPARISONS OF JOINT COST, OPTIMALITY GAP AND RUNETIME IN THE TWO-AREA AND THE THREE-AREA TEST SYSTEMS
System Two-area 12-bus Three-area 457-busCost (k$) Gap Runtime (s) Cost (k$) Gap Runtime (s)
Centralized 154.87 - 0.55 6,292.26 - 4,111.78
MILP-VF 154.87 0.00% 12.85 6,293.95 0.03% 239.48
ADMM-AOP 156.00 0.24% 2.69 7,034.51 11.80% 222.77
Islanded 68.22+87.83=156.05 0.76% 0.48+0.28 287.45+965.98+5,945.93=7,199.35 14.42% 0.99+6.28+11.88
Fig. 5. Comparison of tie-line power scheduled by the centralized method,
the proposed value function based method and the ADMM-AOP method in
the two-area system.
Centralized MILP-VF ADMM-AOP
Fig. 6. Comparison of unit commitment scheduled by the centralized method,
the proposed value function based method and the ADMM-AOP method in
the two-area system.
For the two-area system, we further detail the differences of
interchange scheduling and unit commitment achieved by each
method. As shown in Fig. 5, the tie-line power of MILP-VF
is closer to the optimal one in terms of the shape or tendency,
while that of ADMM-AOP is closer to the optimal one in terms
of the amount and the direction of power interchange. It is
unexpected that the UC solution of MILP-VF shows symmetry
with the globally optimal solution, i.e., the unit statues in area
1 of MILP-VF is coincides with those in area 2 of Centralized,
and vice versa (see Fig. 6). Note that although area 1 and area
2 have similar system configurations, their load demands are
very different. In fact, this case shows that the global optimal
solution of MILP is unnecessary unique; it also verifies that
the SCUC value functions are highly nonlinear, and hence two
very distinct tie-line injection solutions may lead to similar or
even identical optimal objective values.
Finally, the computational time of these methods are re-
ported in Table II. In the two-area case, our value function
based method takes more computational time, while the cen-
tralized method only takes 0.55 seconds to globally solves
the M-SCUC problem. In the three-area case, the runtime
TABLE III
PAYOFFS, COSTS AND PAYMENTS OF EACH AREA IN THE TWO-AREA
SYSTEM.
Item Definition Area 1 Area 2
φa(v) payoff (k$) -67.63 -87.24
Va(z
∗
a) cost (k$) 77.61 77.26
ψa payment (k$) -9.98 9.98
of MILP-VF and ADMM-AOP is very close and less than
four minutes, whereas the centralized method takes more than
one hour. Solving each SCUC problem separately is time-
saving in both cases, but always leads to the lowest economic
efficiency. Overall, the proposed MILP-VF method can reduce
the runtime of solving large-scale M-SCUC problem, while at
the same time guarantee a high degree of optimality.
C. Savings Allocation and Comparison with the LMP Method
Based on the SCUC value functions, the worth of each
coalition can be yielded from solving problem (14), e.g.,
v({1}) = −V1(0) = −68.22 k$ (see Table II). Then, by
substituting the values of v(C) into Equation (8), the payoffs
can be obtained. Further, Equation (15) is employed to calcu-
late the payments between areas. Take area 1 of the two-area
system for example: first, the payoff is
φ1(v) =
|∅|! (|{1, 2}| − |∅| − 1)!
|{1, 2}|! (v({1})− v(∅)) +
|{2}|! (|{1, 2}| − |{2}| − 1)!
|{1, 2}|! (v({1, 2})− v({2}))
=
1
2
((−68.22− 0) + (−154.87 + 87.83)) = −67.63,
and then the payment of area 1 is expressed by ψ1 = −77.61+
67.63 = −9.98 k$. Applying the same procedure to area 2
yields 9.98 k$, which means that area 2 should pay 9.98 k$
to area 1 (see Table III).
The payment between area 1 and area 2 calculated via
LMPs is slightly different, i.e., 7.72 k$. We know that LMP
is the summation of the marginal costs of power generation
and congestion, but it doesn’t account for some non-linear or
non-convex factors like start-up cost [21]. On the contrary,
the SCUC value functions fully describe the opportunity cost
and the marginal contribution of each area, and the payments
derived from the Shapley value ensure equity and rationality.
The payments of the three-area system is reported in Fig. 7.
It shows that compared with the results of the LMPs based
method, area 1 receives less while area 2 and 3 pay less.
Moreover, the Shapley value indicates that area 2 can receive
5.00 k$ even though it has imported 9,699.34 MWh (the ave-
rage price of electricity is negative). This is counterintuitive,
8Fig. 7. Comparison of payments between areas derived from the Shapley
value and LPMs.
however, it is quite reasonable if one recognizes that without
trading with area 2, the total cost of area 1 and area 3 would
increase by 171.02 k$.
Finally, it should be noted that even though LMPs of convex
problems are well-defined, and cooperative game theory is also
suitable for convex markets, there is no evidence showing that
the payments for convex dispatch problems yielded from the
LMPs based method and the Shapley value would coincide.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a new global solution method for
the decentralized multi-area power systems SCUC problem,
based on the sets of UC solutions that describe the SCUC
value functions. The UC solutions can be generated off-line
and repeatedly used, while solving the interchange schedul-
ing problem is computationally efficient, iteration-free and
convergence-guaranteed. Even if only a subset of the full set of
UC solutions is available, the interchange scheduling yielded
from our method is still very close to the globally optimal
one. In general, the value function based method proposed in
this paper can also be applied to decouple a large-scale MILP
problem into tractable sub-problems.
The SCUC value functions constructed here also enable
us to investigate how the generation cost is truly affected
by the power exchange. They can also be applied directly
to derive the Shapley value and the payments of each area.
From the perspective of cooperative game theory, the savings
allocation scheme obtained from the SCUC value functions
and the Shapley value is fair, individually rational and stable.
Thus it provides another possible way of market clearing in
multi-area power systems apart from the LMPs based methods.
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